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COMMENTS
THE PRESUMPTION OF DEATH FROM ABSENCE AS AFFECTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE NONPAYMENT OF PREMIUMS IN LIFE INSURANCE CASES
The doctrine that seven years' unexplained absence from home will
raise a presumption that the missing person is dead has proved a
troublesome one to apply in the insurance cases in which, modernly,
it is chiefly called into play. As long as it is merely employed to
establish the death of a missing spouse, in order to allow remarriage
by the survivor, or in order to permit the distribution of the missing
person's estate, or in many of the other situations where it is relied
upon to establish the fact of death, the courts have little difficulty
with the presumption. But when it is used to establish the death of an
insured person in order to entitle the beneficiary to the proceeds from
the policy of insurance, complications soon appear. The Statute of
Limitations (which in many states is shorter than the period necessary for the presumption of death) raises perplexing problems as to the
proper time for suit, and the same is true as to the effect of nonpayment of premiums during the period of absence.
These problems are strikingly presented in the recent Washington
case of Howard v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.1 The insured,
one Charles Navone, was happily married and highly respected in his
community, but following financial losses he became depressed and
threatened to commit suicide. On March 1, 1930, he boarded a Lake
Washington ferry, but was not seen to leave it at its destination. An
intensive search was made for him, but he was not afterwards heard
of. All premiums on the policy sued on had been paid to that date, and
plaintiff, insured's wife and beneficiary, paid the semi-annual premium
due on July 24, 1930. The plaintiff filed proof of death on May 4,
1937, and after refusal of her demand, brought this action on October
7, 1937. The defendant denied the insured's death, and claimed that the
policy had lapsed for non-payment of the premium due January 24,
1931. Or, alternatively, it claimed that if the insured were dead, he
died on March 1, 1930, so that the action was barred by the Statute of
Limitations. The court held that since there was not sufficient evidence
to prove the death of the insured without the aid of the presumption
of death arising from seven years' absence, the plaintiff had no presently enforceable cause of action until the expiration of that period,
and that therefore the Statute of Limitations did not start to run until
then, giving the plaintiff six years thereafter within which to sue. The
court expressly overruled Warner v. Modern Woodmen of America
in so far as it held that the beneficiary has only a reasonable time after
the expiration of the seven years within which to sue.
American and English courts universally recognize a genuine presumption of death, arising from a person's unexplained absence from
home for seven years without tidings to those who would normally
'197 Wash. 230, 85 P. (2d) 253, 119 A. L. R. 1308 (1938). For another case

on the same facts, but involving a war risk insurance policy, see Howard
v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 985 (1939).
1124 Wash. 252, 214 Pac. 161, 34 A. L. I. 87 (1923). The court in this case

held that four years after the expiration of the seven years was not a
reasonable time within which to sue.
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hear from him. 3 But the problems incidental to the application of this
presumption to life insurance cases have been handled in widely varying ways. These problems center about the determination of the exact
time of death, in connection with the two defenses most commonly
advanced by the insurer-the bar of the Statute of Limitations, and
lapse for non-payment of premiums. Both of these were relied on by
the defendant in the Howard case.
Washington, along with the English and a majority of American
courts, has consistently followed the rule which is reaffirmed in this
case, that the exact time of death is a question for the jury, since the
presumption of the fact of death includes no presumption as to the
time within the seven years at which death actually occurred. Therefore, these courts place the burden of proving that death occurred at,
prior to, or subsequent to a particular time upon the person claiming
a right, to the establishment of which that fact is essential. 4
But a considerable number of courts in this country have held that
in the absence of evidence fixing death at some particular time the
insured is presumed to have survived during the whole of the sevenyear period and to have died at its expiration. 5 On purely logical
grounds it seems clear that it is less likely that the insured died at
the end of the period than at any other time. However, while arbitrary, such a rule has the advantage of avoiding an occasional procedural impasse, where the plaintiff or moving party is a mere stakeholder and neither of the contending litigants is able to sustain the
burden of proof as to the exact time of death. 6 But as applied to
insurance cases, the rule has the disadvantage of requiring the beneficiary to pay premiums during the entire seven years, even though
he may be certain that death occurred at or near the beginning of the
period.'
The insurance cases where reliance is placed on the seven years'
presumption fall generally into two groups. In one may be included
the cases where there is no evidence at all as to any particular time
of death, but in the other group, as in the Howard case, there is often
strong evidence of death at the beginning of the period. In the latter
type of death, of course, the safest procedure for the beneficiary to
SNepean v. Doe d. Knight, 2 M. & W. 894, Murph. & IL 291, 150 E. R. 1021,
7 L. J. Fx 335, 8 E. R. C. 512 (1837); Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628 (1878);
Butler v. Supreme Court of the Independent Order of Foresters, 53 Wash.
118, 101 Pac. 481, 26 L. R. A. (N.s.) 293 (1909); Shaw v. Prudential Life
Ins. Co., 158 Wash. 43, 290 Pac. 694 (1930); Harris v. Security Benefit Assn.,
185 Wash. 25, 52 P. (2d) 329 (1935); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 2531 (b).
'Nepean v. Doe d. Knight, Butler v. Supreme Court of the Independent
Order of Foresters, both supra note 3; Peterson v. Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 172, 235 Pac. 15 (1925); 2 CHRArVILAYNE, MODERN
LAW OF EVIDENCE (1911)

§ 1114.

'Montgomery v. Bevans, 1 Sawy. 653, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9, 735, 4 Am. Law.
T. Rep. U. S. Cts. 202 (C. C. D. Cal. 1871); Whiting v. Nicholl, 46 Ill. 230,
92 Am. Dec. 248 (1867); Fanning v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 264
Pa. 333, 107 Atl. 715 (1919); Falk v. Empire State Degree of Honor, 143
Misc. 486, 256 N. Y. Supp. 794 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
'In re Rhodes, Rhodes v. Rhodes, 36 Ch. D. 586, 56 L. J. Ch. 825, 57 L. T.
652 (1887).
'See Notes (1916) 3 VA. L. REV. 451 and (1932) 17 CoRN. I, Q. 274 for
contrasting attitudes toward this rule.
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follow would be to pay premiums for the seven years, and then sue
to recover those paid after the time which the court fixes as the date
of death. In Fordyce v. Modern Woodmen of Americas and Harris v.
Security Benefit Association9 our court allowed such recovery, and
that position is reaffirmed in the Howard case, the plaintiff being allowed to recover the premium paid on July 24, 1930.
However, many beneficiaries, like the plaintiff here, neglect to continue paying premiums after they are certain that the insured is dead.
But the courts agree that the premiums must have been paid until the
date of death, as judicially determined.' 0 And so where premiums are
not paid after the insured's disappearance, the beneficiary is placed
under the necessity of proving death before the lapse of the policy.
Where the insured was in peril when last heard of the courts are
usually willing to find that death occurred at that time, both in cases
where the seven-year presumption is relied on and where the suit is
brought before the expiration of this period." A few other courts have
held that the occurrence of death at the beginning of the period can be
inferred merely from evidence that the person who has disappeared was
of a cheerful disposition, attached to his family and friends, and in
good circumstances. 1 2 In Tisdale v. Connecticut Mutual Insurance
Co.' s the Iowa court held that "any facts or circumstances relating to
the character, habits, condition, affections, attachments, prosperity and
objects in life, which usually control the conduct of men, and are the
motives of their action, are competent evidence from which may be
inferred the death of one absent and unheard from, whatever has been
the duration of such absence." This passage was quoted approvingly by
the Washington court in the Butler case" but has never been actually
applied in this state. But generally, whenever the missing person was
dangerously ill at the time of his disappearance, had embarked on a
vessel iot since heard from, or probably committed suicide, the jury
is allowed to find that death occurred at the beginning of the period.
The courts are very lenient in upholding such findings, perhaps out of
a desire to avoid penalizing the beneficiary who has stopped paying
premium& 5
'129 Wash. 364, 225 Pac. 434 (1924).
'185 Wash. 25, 52 P. (2d) 329 (1935).
"°Johnson v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 163 Mo. App.
728, 147 S. W. 510 (1912); Security Bank v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc.,
112 Va. 462, 71 S. E. 647, 35 L. R. A. (N.s.) 159, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 836 (1911);
Note (1918) L. R. A. 1918B, 93.
"Robinson v. Robinson, 51 Il1. App. 317 (1893); Davie v. Briggs, 97
U. S. 628 (1878) cited supra note 3; Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150, 33 Am. Dec.
50 (Pa. 1838); Coe v. National Council of Knights & Ladies of Security,
96 Neb. 130, 147 N. W. 112 (1914); JoiEs, LAW oF EVmENcE ns CIVIL CAsES

(2d ed. 1908) t 63.
"Fidelity Mutual Life Assn. v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308 (1902); Bradley v.
Modern Woodmen of America, 146 Mo. App. 428, 124 S. W. 69 (1910); Cox
v. Ellsworth, 18 Neb. 664, 26 N. W. 460 (1886); GasENrEAr, EVIDENCE (16th

ed. 1899) § 41.
"26 Iowa 170, 96 Am. Dec. 136 (1868).
"'Butler v. Supreme Court of the Independent Order of Foresters, 53
Wash. 118, 101 Pac. 481, 26 L. R. A. (N.s.) 293 (1909).
uSovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Boden, 117 Tex. 229, 1
S. W. (2d) 256 (1921); Butler v. Supreme Court of the Independent Order
of Foresters, 60 Wash. 171, 110 Pac. 1007 (1910); Harris v. Security Benefit
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Although this leniency of the courts allows recovery by a good many
beneficiaries when premium payments were discontinued immediately
after the disappearance of the insured, it results in a rather anomalous
situation as far as the Statute of Limitations is concerned. The plaintiff
is forced to argue, and the courts tend to find, that the insured died
at the beginning of the seven-year period. The insurer then argues
that if this is true the action is barred by the running of the Statute of
Limitations. The courts have developed various devices for avoiding
this result. One commentator has recognized three possible views in
this connection. 16 According to one of these, the Statute of Limitations
is suspended until the termination of the seven-year period, and then
begins to run." Another holds that the cause of action arises at the end
of the seven-year period and that it is intended that the beneficiary
have a reasonable time after the end of the period in which to sue.18
The third view is that the cause of action does not accrue until after the
seven-year period, and that the Statute of Limitations runs from that
time.' " The Howard case clearly comes under the latter view. Perhaps
the Warner case, supra, represents a fourth, and rather hybrid point
of view. It held that the cause of action arose at the death of the
insured but that the Statute was suspended until the end of the seven
years necessary to establish death, and that a reasonable time should
be allowed thereafter in which to sue. It will be noted that the Washington court has at various times adhered to three of these four views,
though it has now expressly overruled its holding in the Warner case,
supra. The two which remain unimpaired have the same net effect,
though based on different rationales. The one set forth in the Howard
case is probably intended to be set up as a definitive rule for the
future. It has the advantage, from the standpoint of consistent logic,
of being in accord with the general rule that the statute starts to run
when the cause of action accrues, i. e., when suit may be brought.2 "
It thus avoids the necessity, which arises under the view advanced in
the Fordyce case, supra, of relying on a "suspension" of the statute
2It
which is not specifically sanctioned by the statute on that point.
has the additional advantages of being definite, and of allowing the
longest possible period within which to sue, to protect beneficiaries
who delay in bringing suit.
But it is submitted that along with this rule the court might well
adopt the rule of Tisdale v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
Association, 185 Wash. 25, 52 P. (2d) 329 (1935), cited supra note 3; 2
CHAMBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW Or EVIDENCE (1911) § 1113; Note (1938) 38
COL. L. REV. 322, 327. But see Peterson v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 134 Wash. 172, 235 Pac. 15 (1925), cited supra note 4.
"Note (1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 274.
"TFordyce v. Modern Woodmen of America, 129 Wash. 364, 225 Pac. 434
(1924) cited supra note 8.
"Behlmer v. Grand Lodge Ancient Order of United Workmen, 109 Minn.
305, 123 N. W. 1071, 26 L. R. A. (N.s.) 305 (1909).
"Benjamin v. District Grand Lodge, Independent Order of B'nai B'rith,
171 Cal. 260, 152 Pac. 731 (1915); 7

COUCH,

CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW

(1930) § 1640.
-"Paulson v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. Kan. 1935); New York
& Penn. Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 300 Pa. 242, 150 Atl. 480 (1930).
"REM. REV. STAT. § 157.
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supra, as to the abridgement of the period necessary to give rise -to
the presumption of death from absence. That is, the courts should relax
the rule sufficiently to allow evidence which is now held adequate to
establish the time of death, when the fact of death has been established
by the presumptibn, to establish the fact of death as well, independently
of the presumption. In view of the greater ease of communication
today, it seems but logical that where, as in the Howard case, the insured's character and habits are such as to indicate that he would
not voluntarily refrain from communicating with his family, and where
he disappears under circumstances logically suggesting suicide or accidental death at that time, the courts should be willing to presume
death after a much shorter period of time than seven years. This
would eliminate many of the difficulties which usually arise in relation
to premium payments and the Statute of Limitations. It would also
allow earlier recovery by beneficiaries in need of the money. Of course
this is open to the objection that it might make for an increase in fraud,
but since this rule will be of limited application, based upon the insured's character and the circumstances of his disappearance, careful
trying of such cases should be a sufficient protection. And under the
Propproposed Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Abentee's
22
erty Act approximately this approach would be adopted.
Where it is still necessary to rely upon the seven-year presumption
to establish the fact of death, the problem of lapse for non-payment
of premiums might be solved by shifting the burden on this issue to the
insurer, to prove that the insured died subsequent to the lapsing of
the policy. This is in the nature of an affirmative defense and might
well be shifted to the insurer as the party who normally first injects
it into the case, and to whose interest it is to establish this fact. The
rule in Washington that the burden of proof on this issue is on the insured rests solely on the Warner"2 and Peterson24 cases, and it was
simply announced and applied in the decisions there, without any discussion or citation of authority. The Howard case cites the Peterson
case and reaffirms the rule without discussion. So in this way, without
any apparent reason, the often insurmountable burden of proof as
to payment of premiums until the date of death is cast upon the
beneficiary. Aside from this fact, the rule in the Howard case seems
a fair and sensible one. But if it were supplemented as suggested
above by the infusion of modifications along the line of the Tisdale
case, supra, it would seem that a more balanced and comprehensive rule
could be formulated.
KENNETH Cox.

"See Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 322, 330, for an expression of this view.
And for the Uniform Act (in its Fourth Tentative Draft) see the Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, §§ 1(1) and 10(2) (1938).
"Warner v. Modern Woodmen of America, 124 Wash. 252, 214 Pac. 161, 34
A. L. I. 87 (1923).
"Peterson v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 172, 235 Pac.
15 (1925).

